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On October 30, 1980 Eastern and Western diplomats marked the seventh anniversary of negotiations in Vienna, 
Austria on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. For the past seven years 
representatives of twelve NATO nations and seven Warsaw Pact countries have been meeting weekly in the 
Redoutensaal of the  Hapsburg, the palace of the Hapsburg Emperors of Austria, to discuss ways of contributing to a 




During the year prior to this anniversary, the mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) talks were characterized 
by more than the usual amount of activity. In December 1979 the West, in conjunction with NATO's decision to 
deploy new theater nuclear weapons in Europe, introduced a proposal for a simplified first phase agreement in 
Vienna. The following spring, both sides presented updated data, valid as of January 1, 1980, on the level of their 
armed forces in Central Europe. Beginning in July 1980 the East offered serious comments about the package of 
associated measures submitted by the Westin December 1979, along with its proposal for a simplified first phase 
agreement. The East also introduced new proposals that scaled down the size of Soviet manpower reductions in a 
first phase. And the West agreed to consider this latest Eastern proposal once agreement has been reached on the 
essential elements of a first phase agreement, including data and associated measures. B ut, if success in arms 
control endeavors is defined as signing a formal agreement or treaty, the MB FR talks have failed: for, despite 
this flurry of activity in Vienna, an agreement was nowhere in sight. 
MB FR is entering a critical period, one that will determine the future course ~ even, perhaps, the continued 
existence ~ of the negotiations. The absence of conclusive progress after seven years of talks, low visibility in 
the West European and, particularly, the American press, and a growing sense that political interest and 
momentum shifted in 1980-1981 at the Madrid review meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (CSCE) away from MBFR to a follow-on meeting along the lines of the French proposal for a 
Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), have collectively contributed to the atmosphere of crisis 
surrounding MBFR That atmosphere has been intensified by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 
1979, President Carter's decision not to seek Senate ratification of the SALT H Treaty, and the political and 
economic upheaval in Poland (which is, by the way, a direct participant in the MBFR negotiations). Whether 
MBFR would ~ or even should ~ emerge from these challenges intact depended in large part on the willingness 
of Western participants to reassess their objectives, strategy, and negotiating tactics in Vienna ~ something that 
the West has not done since the negotiations began in October 1973. 
This article has four objectives. The first is simply to indicate where the MBFR talks are and from whence 
they have come. The second is to summarize the negotiating principles that underlie the positions of East and 
West. The third is to outline the major outstanding issues that continue to block agreement in Vienna. And the 
fourth is to assess future prospects for MBFR, the relative merits of alternative forums for serious discussions 
about arms control in Europe, and the pressing need for an MBFR strategy. 
BACKGROUND 
When the MBFR negotiations were launched in 1973 they were viewed by participants and observers 
alike as a political component of detente, a price to be paid by the East for the West's agreement to enter 
into CSCE, or a means of delaying the unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG).
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 No one involved in the preparatory stages of the talks had any illusions that the 
discussions would result in an early and significant reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central 
Europe. 
The opening of MBFR marked the introduction of a European dimension to what had been until then an essentially 
bilateral arms control process between the United States and the Soviet Union, epitomized by the SALT I 
agreement. When Presidents Nixon and Breams, raised problems of European security in their joint statement 
of principles following the Moscow Summit in May 1972, West Europeans expressed concern about the 
possible compromise of their interests in a bilateral forum.
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 MB FR provided a multilateral framework 
within which Allied security concerns would figure prominently, while the bloc-to-bloc nature of the talks 
assured U.S. influence. 
Characterized by West German Chancellor Willy Brandt as "a proving ground for detente,"
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 MBFR was 
seen as a way to test the seriousness of the Soviet Union's commitment to detente. With the groundwork 
for detente laid in the signing of a treaty normalizing relations with the FRG in 1971, the Quadripartite 
Agreement on Berlin, and the SALT I agreement, the Soviets clearly wanted to pursue the political and economic 
aspects of detente. One of the most compelling Soviet proposals during this period was for the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe, designed by them to focus on the nonmilitary aspects of detente. Although Brandt's 
Ostpolitik had resulted in the acceptance of the political status quo in Europe, the West was not prepared to 
increase the pace of detente without serious consideration of its military dimension. Thus, in an effort both to resist 
further Soviet political demands and to test its seriousness of purpose, the West proposed talks to reduce the level of 
military confrontation in Central Europe. The West's price for its agreement to proceed with CSCE was Soviet 
agreement to pursue M BFR. 
MBFR served yet another purpose for the U.S. In May 1967 NATO announced the withdrawal of 35,000 
U.S. troops and a British brigade from Central Europe. The Federal Republic of Germany followed suit 
with an announcement of plans to cut its defense budget.
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 The pressures for unilateral withdrawal of U.S. 
forces from the FRG, led by Senator Mike Mansfield, escalated, threatening a major disengagement of U.S. 
forces from Europe. MBFR provided the Nixon Administration with an argument for delay — why 
proceed with unilateral withdrawals of U.S. forces from Germany when those forces could be used as 
bargaining chips in negotiations designed to reduce the level of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe? Although 
this argument was designed primarily for domestic consumption, it was also used effectively to influence the 
Allies to maintain their force levels in the face of pressures from their publics to cut defense budgets. 
NEGOTIATING PRINCIPLES 
Although the West had pressed for negotiations to begin in the fall of 1973, it entered the discussions with 
no clear strategy for reaching any agreements. Western participants did agree, however. that the East 
enjoyed a geographical advantage and superiority in military manpower over NATO forces in Central 
Europe. Western participants also agreed that a significant imbalance between the forces of East and West was 
potentially destabilizing. 
Thus the West, from the beginning, has specified as its objectives in MB FR approximate parity or equality 
in the military manpower of the two sides in the NATO Guidelines Area (NGA). Parity has been defined as 
acceptance of a common collective ceiling on the military manpower of each side after  reductions of 
approximately 700,000 for ground forces and 900,000 for ground and air forces combined. 
The West has also argued that East and West must agree on a data base covering the forces of both sides, by 
which to identify agreed starting points for reductions, the size of reductions necessary to reach the common 
collective ceiling, and  any additional residual subceilings . The West contends that, without an agreement on the data 
base, a treaty involving manpower reductions and limitations is impossible. 
Another important principle in the West's negotiating position has been that each group of participants would assure 
the other, in a collective fashion, that the agreed overall manpower levels obtained following reductions (i.e., 
the common collective ceiling) would not be exceeded. The West also believes that, due to geographical 
advantages enjoyed by the Soviet Union (i.e., its proximity to the NGA and the resulting ease of reinforcement 
from the Western Military Districts), there should be no sublimits on forces in the area of reductions. 
The West's position on the place of armament reductions in MBFR has changed over time. The initial Western 
proposal, tabled in November 1973, called for the reduction of ground force manpower on both sides to the 
common collective ceiling of 700,000 men in two phases. In the first phase, the U.S. would withdraw 29,000 men, 
leaving their equipment behind. The Soviet Union would withdraw a tank army, consisting of 68,000 men and 1,700 
tanks. That position was modified in December 1975, when the West added a "sweetener" to its earlier proposal, 
namely, that the U.S. would withdraw 1,000 nuclear warheads, 54 F-4 nuclear-capable aircraft, and 36 
Pershing ballistic missile launchers, in addition to the 29,000 men. Known as "Option III," this initiative 
introduced the prospect of reductions and limitations on Western as well as Eastern armaments. A further 
modification of the West's position on armaments in MBFR occurred in December 1979 when ~ in conjunction 
with NATO's decision to deploy new theater nuclear weapons in Europe ~ the West presented a new proposed 
for a simplified first-phase agreement which deferred discussion of any armaments issues to a second phase. 
Like the West, the East entered the talks without a clear strategy. This is not surprising, since Eastern motivations for 
entering M BFR were entirely different from those of the West. The East merely agreed to "go along" with MBFR 
in exchange for Western participation in CSCE, while the West initiated the process both for domestic political 
reasons and to add a military dimension to detente in Europe. 
Eastern participants, based on "official" data on their forces, have claimed that parity already exists in Central Europe 
and, thus, that the West's demands for asymmetrical manpower reductions on the part of the East are merely thinly 
disguised efforts to achieve military advantage. Based on the assumption that parity already existed, the East initially 
pressed for equal percentage manpower reductions (amounting to approximately 17 percent of the forces of each 
side) taken in three annual stages, rather than for reductions to a common collective ceiling. 
Eastern participants have also argued that manpower reductions could be taken without an agreed data base on the 
forces of East and West. Assuming that parity exists, both sides would take their manpower reductions from 
essentially the same level and thus accept limitations on their forces at the same residual level. Thus, from the 
East's perspective, the "data discrepancy" is a bogus issue which the West has used merely as a negotiating tactic 
to postpone serious discussion of elements of an initial agreement designed to reduce the military manpower of 
both sides in Central Europe. 
 
The East, like the West, has called for a mechanism to control possible expansion of the forces of both sides 
following manpower reductions. Unlike the West, however, the East proposed what, in effect,  amounted to 
national ceilings on the forces of all direct participants. This principle reflected Eastern concerns about possible 
peacetime expansion of the Bundeswehr, which could occur under the West's collective limitations formulation. The 
fact that certain NATO countries (e.g., the U.K., Belgium, and the Netherlands, as well as the U .S.) were under 
pressure to reduce the size of their active forces in the early 1970's, and the perception that only the FRG would be 
capable of compensating for these reductions certainly must have fueled Eastern concerns. 
In comparison to the West, the East's position on the place of armaments reductions in MBFR has been consistent. The 
East's first proposal, tabled in November 1973, which called for equal percentage reductions by both sides, 
stipulated that all types of forces and armaments — ground, air, and nuclear would be included. The East has 
maintained the position that armaments should be included along with whatever manpower reductions are 
taken in both first and second phases of reductions; at a minimum, forces departing from the area of reductions 
would take their equipment with them. 
The early stages of the negotiations thus revealed disagreement between the two sides on several major principles. First, 
East and West disagreed about the nature of the military balance in Central Europe and on the ultimate objective of 
the negotiations. The East argued that "balance" already existed and that equal percentage reductions in the 
military manpower of both sides should be the aim of the negotiations; the West argued that the East possessed 
military superiority and that genuine parity in the form of a common collective ceiling on the military manpower 
of both sides should be the objective of the talks. Second, East and West disagreed on the necessity of an agreed data 
base for the forces of both sides before reductions could be taken. The West argued that agreed data was required to 
calculate the size of reductions necessary to reach the common collective ceiling as well as to monitor limitations on 
manpower following reductions; the East claimed that data agreement was unnecessary, and merely a tactic 
adopted by the West to delay serious discussions of force reductions. Third, East and West disagreed on the 
nature of the limitations which would operate on the forces of both sides following reductions. The West argued 
for the principle of collectivity, that is, for a collective or overall limit on the forces of each side, with sublimits 
only on U.S. and Soviet forces; the East pressed for national limitations on the forces of all direct participants. 
Fourth, East and West initially disagreed on the place of armaments reductions and limitations in MBFR. The 
West's position on this issue vacillated until, in 1979, it proposed postponing discussion of armaments to a second 
phase of negotiations; the East pressed consistently for withdrawal of armaments with personnel. 
In the course of the negotiations, the East has made concessions, in principle, on three of these four issues. In 
June 1978, Eastern participants accepted the idea of a common collective ceiling and parity at 700,000 ground forces 
as the objective of the talks. At the same time, however, they made this concession contingent upon Western 
acceptance of Eastern data on Warsaw Pact forces, data which the West considers inaccurate. More recently, on 
November 13, 1980, Eastern participants apparently abandoned their demand for national ceilings and proposed 
instead a collective freeze on the forces of all direct participants on each side for a three-year interim period. 
Nevertheless, the East argued that data already tabled in the negotiations provided a sufficient basis for such a 
collective freeze. Although the East's current position on armaments reductions and limitations is less clear, it 
seems to have accepted the Western proposal to postpone discussion of armaments to a second phase. Despite these 
concessions in principle, fundamental differences remain over the necessity of agreed data for an initial MBFR 
agreement. 
 
CURRENT NEGOTIATION POSITIONS 
In an effort to move the negotiations forward, the West introduced a proposal for a simplified first-phase 6 
agreement on December 20,1979. That proposal called for the reduction of 13,000 U.S. and 30,000  Soviet ground 
forces in a first phase, based on agreed data on U.S. and Soviet ground force manpower in the NGA. The 
issue of armaments reductions, long a stumbling block to agreement, is postponed to a second phase of 
negotiations, in an effort to simplify discussions in Phase I. In addition, both sides would agree to a package of 
associated measures ~ or confidence-building measures designed to increase confidence as well as to help 
monitor provisions of the agreement. 
In connection with a first-phase agreement, all direct participants would commit themselves to negotiations 
in a second phase and to cooperation toward resolution of the remaining data discrepancy, through agreement on 
data for the ground and air force manpower of both sides in the NGA. Each side would also agree to reduce its 
ground force manpower by the amount required to reach the common collective ceiling on ground forces set 
at approximately 700,000 men, based on agreement on overall data. Moreover, other provisions designed 
to ensure the security of flank participants could be negotiated. 
The Eastern response to the West's December 1979 proposals was not long in coining. Initially, Eastern 
participants charged the West with having taken a step backward in the negotiations, pointing to the fact that 
the December proposals reduced the size of Phase I reductions by the U.S. to 13,000 men, and eliminated 
armaments reductions. The East tabled a more detailed response on July 10, 1980, in which it proposed a 
further adjustment in the size of U .S. and Soviet reductions in Phase I. Referring to Brezhnev's 
announcement on October 6, 1979, that the Soviet Union would withdraw up to 20,000 men from the German 
Democratic Republic within one year, and later claims by the Soviet Union that these withdrawals had been 
completed, the East proposed a reduction of 20,000 Soviet ground forces in Phase I in exchange for the 
reduction of 13,000 U.S. ground faces. Eastern participants claim that, in effect, this amounts to the 
reduction of 40,000 Soviets for only 13,000 Americans. For the first time, the East also indicated it could 
accept some form of associated measures ("special procedures," in its words) as a means of guaranteeing to 
the West that Eastern forces once withdrawn from the NGA would not be reintroduced. 
At the same time, the East reiterated elements of its previous proposals, namely, that all direct participants 
must commit themselves in Phase I to take substantial, commensurate reductions to the common collective 
ceiling on ground forces in Phase II and that each participant's reductions must be approximately proportional 
to the total strength of its forces in the NGA. 
On October 2, 1980, Western participants responded to the East's suggestion that a further adjustment should 
be made in the size of U.S. and Soviet reductions in Phase I. The West's position is that, once agreement has 
been reached on the main elements of a Phase I agreement, including data and associated measures, it would be 
willing to consider the size of U.S. and Soviet reductions in Phase 1. This was followed on November 13, 
1980, by an Eastern proposal for a collective freeze on the forces of all direct participants on each side for a 
three-year interim period, based on data already tabled in the negotiations. Figure 1 illustrates the current 
negotiating positions of East and West. 
OUTSTANDING ISSUES 
There are three outstanding issues which have created obstacles to a first-phase agreement in MBFR. These 
issues are the "data discrepancy," the nature of limitations on residual forces, and the role of associated 
measures for verification and confidence building. 
The Data Discrepancy 
In November 1973 the West introduced its estimates of NATO and Warsaw Pact ground forces in the NGA, 
as well as separate figures for U.S. and Soviet ground forces in the area. Western figures revealed that there 
were  925,000 Warsaw Pact ground force personnel in the NGA, 460,000 of which were Soviet. The West 




The East presented no data of its own until June 1976, when it tabled figures on its ground and air forces 
in the NGA which it described as valid for January 1, 1976 ~ 805,000 ground, 182,300 air, 987,300 total. 
In December 1976, the West revised its earlier estimates 
CURRENT NEGOTIATING POSITIONS 
NATO WARSAW PACT 
Reductions 
Phase I 
US  reduces 13,000 ground force personnel, two-thirds in units and subunits. 
USSR reduces 30,000 ground force personnel in three divisions. 
Phase II 
NATO and WP reduce to common collective ceiling of about 700,000 ground forces within a combined ground 
and air common collective ceiling of approximately 900,000 men. 
Limitations 
US  reduces 13,000 ground force personnel. East demands that at least a portion of the US reductions be in the 
form of a brigade. 
USSR reduces 20,000 ground force personnel. 
In Phase I, all direct participants commit themselves to take substantial commensurate reductions to the common 
collective ceiling in Phase II, reductions which are approximately proportional to the total strength of its forces 
in N GA; separate ceiling on air forces set at about 200,000 men. Following Phase I. sublimity on US and Soviet 
ground forces at their residual levels: once agreement has been reached on overall data, institute a collective 
freeze on the forces of all direct participants prior to reductions in Phase II. 
Associated Measures 
Agreement to the following package of associated measures in Phase I and their extension in some form in Phase 
II: 
1. Prior notification of out-of-garrison activity. 
2. Exchange of observers at notified activities. 
3. Prior notification of movements of ground forces of direct participants into the area of reductions. 
4. Inspection. 
5. Declared exit/entry points and observers. 
6. Exchange of information. 
7. Non-interference with national technical means. 
Plus establishment of a consultative mechanism and provisions to protect the security of flank states. 
Following Phase I, sublimity on US and Soviet ground forces at their residual levels, a collective freeze on the 
forces of all direct participants prior to reductions in Phase II. 
Agreement to some form of "special procedures" to guarantee that forces once withdrawn would not be reintroduced. 
FIGURE 1 IS OMITTED FROM THIS FORMATTED DOCUMENT 
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of NATO ground forces and provided estimates of the air force personnel, updated to January 1, 1976. Figure 2 
presents Eastern and Western data on NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in the NGA, valid as of January 1, 1976. 
Comparison of Eastern and Western data on Warsaw Pact forces in the NGA reveals a sizable discrepancy. With 
respect to ground force personnel, Western estimates of Warsaw Pact forces are more than 150,000 men greater than 
Eastern estimates. The discrepancy with respect to Pact air force personnel is less, only 17,700 men. These 
differences are noted in Figure 3. 
The implications of the data discrepancy, as these differences have been labeled, for the size of manpower reductions 
required to reach the common collective ceiling on military manpower set at approximately 700,000 for ground force 
personnel and 900,000 for ground and air forces combined in the West's position, are clear. From the West's 
perspective, the East would have to reduce more than 260,000 ground force personnel to reach the common collective 
ceiling of 700,000 men. Based on Eastern estimates of Warsaw Pact forces, the required Eastern reductions would be 
far less, only 105,000 men. This is the aux of the data issue. 
FIGURE 3 IS OMITTED FROM THIS FORMATTED DOCUMENT 
In March 1978 the East and West presented disaggregated data on their forces which revealed 
that the discrepancy between Eastern and Western estimates was greatest in Soviet and Polish forces.11 Since that 
time, the West has made a major effort to clarify the reasons for the discrepancy and to obtain Eastern cooperation in 
resolving it. The East proposed a data update in February 1980. Based on the assumption that data tabled in 1976 were 
no longer valid for negotiations in 1980, the East proposed that each side update data for its own forces in the NGA 
as of January 1, 1980. The update took place in June 1980 and revealed the same magnitude of 
discrepancy ~ approximately 150,000 men between Eastern and Western estimates of Warsaw Pact ground force 
personnel in the NGA.
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The reason for the continuing data discrepancy may lie in the application of different counting 
rules by East and West, which results in the West counting certain types of personnel on the 
Warsaw Pact side as active duty military manpower which are not counted by the East. From 
the beginning of the talks, the West has applied a uniform counting rule in its estimates; that 
is, all personnel wearing army uniforms are counted as ground force personnel. The East, in 
contrast, has applied a functional counting rule; that is, all personnel performing functions 
normally assigned to ground forces are counted as ground force personnel. 
Western participants have argued that the solution to the data discrepancy lies in both sides providing additional 
data on their forces at a lower level of disaggregation, namely, divisional data, and in an extended discussion 
of the counting rules which each side has applied in the generation of its estimates. The East, for its part, claims 
that the West is simply using the data issue to extract information about the structure of Warsaw Pact forces. Since 
the West is unable to guarantee to the East that the next stage of disaggregation will provide the information 
required to resolve the data discrepancy, that effort — in the East's view — is a useless exercise which 
merely distracts attention from negotiating the elements of a Phase I agreement. 
Limitations on Residual Forces 
As a means of dealing with possible circumvention of an MB FR agreement through the reintroduction or the 
replacement of withdrawn forces, both East and West have proposed measures to limit the size of residual forces 
in the NGA. From the beginning of the negotiations, the West has called for collective ceilings on military 
manpower under which each group of participants would be responsible for assuring collectively that 
agreed manpower levels following reductions would not be exceeded. In addition, reflecting the 
geographical proximity to the reductions area of the USSR and the enormous military capabilities of the 
USSR as well as of the U.S., the West has called for a specific sublimit or subceiling on Soviet and U.S. 
military manpower in the NGA. 
In 1976 the East began to charge the West with trying to exclude the Bundeswehr from reductions and 
limitations.
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 This objective was evident — in the East's view — from the Western proposals for 
collective ceilings on military manpower for NATO and the Warsaw Pact and subceilings on U.S. and Soviet 
forces, which would result in limits on Soviet forces without specific limits on the Bundeswehr. In practice, 
this means that nearly 50 percent of NATO forces in the NGA — the proportional contribution of the 
Bundeswehr — would remain free of specific limitations. 
On June 28, 1979, the East accepted the principle of collectivity, but at the same time called for each direct 
participant to reduce proportionally — i.e., according to the percentage of its contribution to its Alliance — 
and to make public these reduction commitments before signing a first-phase agreement. Moreover, the East 
called for national ceilings on the forces of all direct participants following reductions. 14 
The implications of the Eastern position on proportional reductions for the size of reductions required to reach 
the common collective ceiling are clear. The FRG, which accounts for nearly 50 percent of NATO's 
forces in the NGA, would be required to reduce about 45,000 men — nearly 50 percent of the 91,000-man 
Western reduction commitment necessary to reach in Phase II the common collective ceiling of 
approximately 700,000 ground force personnel. The U.S., which accounts for about 25 percent of 
NATO's forces in the NGA, would be required to reduce about 23,000 men total (13,000 in Phase I, the rest 
in Phase II). The Eastern plan for "proportional reductions" thus requires major reductions in the size of the 
Bundeswehr. 
Perhaps even more significant are the implications of the Eastern position on national ceilings for NATO 
force planning. In the West's view, the East's desire to impose national ceilings on the military manpower of all 
direct participants in the reductions area would decrease NATO's flexibility in adjusting the national 
composition of its forces in the NGA. Under the national ceiling formula, for example, decreases in the 
level of active duty military manpower of one NATO member could not be "made up" by 
other Western direct participants. As a result, reductions by one participant would drop 
NATO below the common collective ceiling. In effect, the presence of national ceilings 
within the common ceiling would nullify the concept of collectivity, strictly limit each direct 
participant's forces in the NGA, and deny NATO flexibility to adjust the composition of its 
forces. 
On March 9, 1979, during a Bundestag debate on security questions, FRG Chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt put forward a suggestion which he termed a "personal idea" that, in the context of 
MBFR, no direct participant would maintain or make up more than half of the forces of its 
Alliance in Central Europe. Widely touted as the "50 percent limitation proposal," Schmidt's 
suggestion implied FRG willingness to consider de facto rather than explicit limitations on the 
Bundeswehr. It is unclear whether Schmidt intended this proposal as a formal initiative in 
MBFR During his address before the Bundestag, Schmidt commented that it is up to NATO 
alone, within the collectivity framework, to determine the national composition of its forces in 
the NGA. This suggests that the 50 percent limitation could be the result of an internal Alliance 
agreement, rather than an element in a formal MBFR agreement with the East. Whether 
viewed as a formal initiative or as a personal suggestion, Schmidt's proposal represented an 
effort at compromise between the East's desire for national ceilings and the West's commitment 
to collectivity. 
The East maintained its firm position on national ceilings until July 10, 1980, when it 
proposed a mechanism similar to Schmidt's 50 percent limitation idea for maintaining the 
collective level of the forces of both sides following reductions. The East suggested that the 
numbers of troops of any one participant should not exceed 50 percent of the overall 
collective levels of 900,000 men for each Alliance following reductions to the common 
ceiling. 15 
On November 13, 1980, the East again proposed a collective freeze on the forces of direct 
participants for a three-year interim period, based on data already tabled in the negotiations. The 
Soviet Ambassador to MBFR billed this new formulation of the Eastern freeze proposal as a 
concession to the West because, "what is now required is no longer separate commitments 
by the individual states not to increase their troop strength, but only a collective commitment 
which would ensure for both pacts a certain elbow room." 
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 Although the idea of a collective 
freeze between the phases has been a central element of the Western negotiating position, the 
West has made agreement to a freeze contingent on resolution of the data discrepancy. Since 
the East's data on its forces already tabled in the negotiations is inaccurate in the West's view, 
this Eastern movement may be little more than a concession in principle. The West has yet to 
respond to this Eastern proposal. 
Associated Measures 
From the beginning of the negotiations, the West has insisted that more than manpower 
reductions are required to ensure military stability in Central Europe. Associated measures are 
needed to monitor withdrawals and to ensure that withdrawn forces are not reintroduced or 
replaced. Confidence-building measures, such as prior notification of the movement of forces 
out-of-garrison and the right to send observers to maneuvers, are required to enhance stability by 
reducing the capability to launch a surprise attack. 
In its proposals of November 1973, the East argued that national technical means of 
verification (widely interpreted as satellite photography) are sufficient to verify an MBFR 
agreement and that negotiated verification measures are simply an excuse for Western 
spying. As to the need for confidence-building measures in MBFR, the East has insisted that 
CSCE or some other pan-European conference is the appropriate forum for discussions on this 
subject. 
In response to the East's charges that negotiated verification measures are designed to extract information about 
the structure and activities of its forces, the West has argued that other means of verification are needed to cover 
the reductions area, especially when national technical means are rendered ineffective due to poor weather 
conditions. Moreover, the West believes that confidence- building measures in MBFR would complement 
rather than substitute for similar measures negotiated in the CSCE (or similar) framework. 
On December 20, 1979, the West, in conjunction with its proposal for simplified first-phase agreement in 
MBFR, introduced a specific package of associated measures designed to aid verification and increase 
confidence in Central Europe. These measures involve prior notification of out-of-garrison activity, exchange 
of observers at notified activities, prior notification of movements of ground forces of direct participants into 
the area of reductions, inspection, declared exit/entry points and observers, exchange of information, and 
noninterference with national technical means. In addition, the West proposed establishment of a consultative 
mechanism to monitor post- reduction limitations.
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Perhaps the most controversial element of the Western package of associated measures is the requirement that the 
first two measures (prior notification and observers) should apply not only within the reductions area, but 
throughout Europe, including a significant portion of the westernUSSR.
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 Until December 1979, the negotiations 
took as given the boundaries of the reductions area. The Western associated- measures proposals raised an issue 
which the East claimed had been resolved during the preparatory talks, namely, the limited geographic nature 
of the reductions area. 
What this proposal to extend the area of application of associated measures means for Eastern and, particularly, 
Soviet interests is clear. Although similar confidence-building measures agreed to in the CSCE framework, 
including prior notification of major military maneuvers and exchange of observers, might extend to Soviet 
territory, they might also be more voluntary, less mandatory than similar measures negotiated in the M BFR 
framework, which would involve legally binding, treaty obligations. 
Despite their earlier claims that associated measures of any sort are unnecessary to verify an MBFR agreement, 
Eastern representatives, in the spring of 1980, indicated they would be wi l l i nq to discuss "special procedures" 
to guarantee that forces once withdrawn would not be reintroduced.
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 However, the East has yet to propose 
its own package of such "special procedures" for MB FR. 
Future Prospects, Alternative Forums, And the Need for an MBFR Strategy 
As Eastern and Western participants enter the eighth year of discussions about mutual and balanced force 
reductions in Central Europe, they do so with increasing pessimism concerning the future of their joint 
endeavor. The reasons for this pessimism are multiple and complex. The absence of demonstrable progress on 
the specifics of the talks, including resolution of the data discrepancy, the critical question of the nature of 
limitations on residual forces, and the role of associated measures for verification and confidence-building means 
that it is unrealistic to expect an agreement in MBFR in the near term. Progress toward an agreement requires that 
the East make a political- level decision to move toward the Western position on the critical issues of data and 
associated measures ~ a prospect which most observers of the negotiations view as unlikely at present. 
In the West, the pressures for unilateral withdrawal of forces from Europe which, at least in part, provided the 
impetus for U.S. entry into MBFR seem to have subsided, leading to the conclusion that MBFR  may have 
outlived its usefulness. Moreover, some critics argue that the negotiations have become increasingly irrelevant 
to the critical military problem facing the West in Central Europe, namely, defending Europe against a 
Soviet blitzkrieg attack.
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 This is because the long-term Western objective in the talks — a common 
collective ceiling on military manpower in the N GA - puts the West at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the East due to 
structural and geographical asymmetries. It is not the level at which the ceiling is set that prejudices the West, 
according to this argument, but the existence of a common ceiling that puts Western forces in an unfavorable 
position should a war of maneuver occur, given Soviet abilities to reinforce and concentrate forces much 
faster than the West.
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The pessimism reflected in these specific criticisms of MBFR has been compounded by the emerging belief 
that in the future, the U.S. should expect arms control to do less rather than more in support of our national 
security i nterests.
23
 (By less is generally meant the negotiation of narrow-gauge agreements of limited 
duration which interfere less with force improvement efforts.) This general principle has given rise to the 
suggestion that the U.S. focus on the use rather than the size of military forces in Central Europe — i.e., 
focus on confidence-building measures. In the MBFR context, this means much greater emphasis on 
associated measures and much less on the size of U.S. and Soviet manpower reductions in the near term. 
It also suggests that the French-proposed Conference on Disarmament in Europe may provide a better 
forum in which to negotiate future European security issues.
24
 Should such a meeting emerge from the CSCE 
Review Conference in Madrid, it could provide an alternative to the more geographically and structurally limited 
Vienna talks This is because the French proposal calls for the negotiation of confidence- building measures in a first 
phase which would apply "from the Atlantic to the Urals," and thus cover a significant part of the western Soviet 
Union, territory which is not covered in the MBFR talks. It also provides for coverage of Soviet forces in 
Hungary and other Pact forces (e.g., Bulgaria). In theory at least, confidence-building measures in CDE such as 
prior notification of out of-garrison activities could decrease the risk of surprise attack further by applying to 
more Soviet forces on all Soviet territory in Europe, not simply Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. 
Moreover, from the standpoint of political acceptability, the widening of the area in a post-Madrid forum 
could respond to concerns expressed repeatedly by the FRG that its territory not become a special arms 
control zone in Europe. 
Those who argue the advantages of a post-Madrid forum for negotiating European security propose a transition 
from M BFR to CDE through the negotiation of a simplified Phase I agreement in M BFR along the lines of 
the current Western position in Vienna — which would allow both sides to claim success and permit the 
parties to move into a negotiation about confidence-building measures in a post- Madrid forum.
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 Since the 
manpower reductions called for by this approach are "modest," so the argument goes, they would not 
damage the West's security. Yet the reduction of some forces, however token or symbolic, provides both East 
and West with a successful conclusion to 
MB FR. 
But there are problems associated with this strategy. In the first place, a post-Madrid conference to discuss 
confidence-building measures may not emerge from the discussion of new proposals during the second half of 
the CSCE Review Conference. The CSCE agenda calls for review of the French- proposed CD E, among 
others, but there are no assurances that, before the Review Conference adjourns in mid-July or later, the 35 
participants in Madrid will approve a mandate for further discussion of confidence-building measures. To 
transfer hopes for negotiating European security from MB FR to a post-Madrid forum which is not yet a 
reality is a risky proposition, and will continue to be so until we know the outcome of the CSCE Review 
Conference, And, even if a post-Madrid conference emerges in 1981 or 1982, there is no guarantee that militarily 
significant and mandatory confidence- building measures could be negotiated in a broader forum. Thus, in 
practice, efforts to negotiate militarily significant confidence-building measures in a post-Madrid forum may not 
decrease the risk of surprise attack. Moreover, it is not dear that the "modest" manpower reductions and residual 
limitations called for in proposals to transition from MB FR to CD E through the negotiation of a simplified Phase 
agreement in Vienna are compatible with Western defense objectives.
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During the past year, it has become fashionable to argue that arms control efforts should support force improvements, 
and that narrow- gauge arms control agreements with limited objectives are the best means to that end. In the 
near term, the West should not become involved in arms control regimes which interfere with force 
improvement efforts such as the Long Term Defense Program and the modernization of theater nuclear forces 
in Europe. At the same time, the U.S. must recognize that ongoing arms control discussions are necessary to 
obtain domestic support, both here and in Western Europe, for increased defense spending and force 
modernization programs. Thus, the West needs a flexible arms control position to deal with military problems 
facing the Alliance. 
But, over the long term, Western arms control objectives are less clear. This is because we have not addressed the 
question of how arms control in Europe should work. Should we view arms control merely as a way to protect 
U.S. defense programs while maximizing Allied contributions to Western defense efforts? Or should we pursue 
arms control ambitiously, with the aim of achieving a militarily significant agreement that results in drastic cuts in 
the level of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe? Western responses to these questions will lay the basis for a strategy 
for arms control in Europe which takes as its central premise that arms control efforts should support defense 
objectives. Whether that strategy will call for the negotiation of narrow-gauge agreements of limited duration or 
more drastic cuts in the levels of forces in Central Europe remains to be seen ~ and the answer should not be 
presumed, one way or the other. 
Neither should we assume that MBFR has outlived its usefulness. In the long term, the West may decide that 
MBFR or an MBFR-l i ke forum is more conducive to the negotiation of European security than is CSCE or a post-
Madrid conference on confidence-building measures, should one occur. But the answer to the question of which 
forum or forums are most appropriate for the discussion of arms control in Europe must await the 
determination of U.S. and Allied objectives. 
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